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Summary: This study deals with important issues related to the new political
macroeconomics and its appliance to the economic movements in Serbia, 
which is a country of “new democracy” as well as with transition economy. In
political macroeconomics, it is a known fact that the economic policy instru-
ments can be used for political purposes – simulated improvement of economic 
indicators to win the elections. These options assume specific features in tran-
sition economies, such as the Serbian economy. The political instability in
Serbia, reflected in frequent elections, as well as in the diversity in political and
economic goals of the key political parties leading to increasing political uncer-
tainty in both the pre-election and post-election periods, weakened the eco-
nomic system. Simultaneously, using the economic policy for political purposes
to support the “pro-democratic” and “pro-European” parties proved to be para-
doxically justified.
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The new approach to macroeconomic instability, particularly macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, concerns political impact to macroeconomic performances because the poli-
cymakers are opportunistically and ideologically motivated politicians. These mo-
tives are essential to explain the decisions of policymakers who sometimes create 
economic fluctuations (booms and recessions) rather than fixing them. This approach 
is the subject of the New Political Macroeconomics (NPM), the development of 
which marked contemporary macroeconomics in the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury. 
The NPM relies on achievements in macroeconomics, theory of choice, and 
game theory in considering the following issues: (i) connection between politics and 
economics in the framework of political business cycles, inflation, unemployment, 
and stabilization policy; (ii) economic instability and conflicts in connection with 
government forms and institutional arrangements; (iii) connection between dictator-
ship, democracy, inequality, and economic growth; (iv) strength of a national econ-
omy and its integration into global economy.  
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The NPM analysis is applicable in democracies, although there are many ways 
to organize and run a democracy, with a variety of democratic institutions and prac-
tices. As the democratic process is not so benevolent, countries with developed de-
mocracies (the so-called “old democracies”) are characterized by strong institutions 
that limited incumbents’ manipulation of economic policy, both monetary and fiscal 
policies. However, preferences of both politicians and voters could stimulate policy-
makers to manipulate, especially if they are faced with naïve voters who are not fully 
aware that politicians maximize their own utility. This is the main characteristic of 
voters in those countries that started with democratization in the 1990s, parallel with 
economic transition. These, “new democracies,” characterized by weak institutions, 
are more prone to political business cycles, especially to political budget cycles, con-
sidering limits of monetary policy, due to central-bank independency. In the “new 
democracies,” including Serbia, incumbents’ and voters’ preferences regarding infla-
tion, unemployment, and economic growth become more specific as well as face 
constraints. These countries are faced with the alternative to abandon both the proc-
ess of economic transition and democratization due to costs of economic transition, 
incumbents’ manipulation of economic policy, and consequently, the lack of broad 
public support for the changes. 
 
1. The Nature of Modern Macroeconomics and the Role of  
Political Macroeconomics 
 
Macroeconomic theory is a kind of stalemate, because its method is basically inade-
quate for the reality and existence it should explain. Instability and changes are not 
congruent with the market philosophy of cleaning the market, stability and equilib-
rium, agents’ rationality, their awareness, and forecasts, with the basic philosophical 
assumption of "as if" – ceteris paribus – everything else is unchangeable and perma-
nent. Changes impose instability and the indeterminism of market behavior cannot be 
molded for any elegant "Procrustean bed" of macroeconomic models, those of naive, 
adaptive, or rational expectations of the neoclassical economics, or the limited ra-
tionality of the new Keynesians (Athol Fitzgibons 2000). 
Despite decades of intellectual efforts, no one has yet managed to explain how 
rational maximizing behavior of individuals, whether consumers or producers, causes 
just the same macroeconomic volatility and instability (Brian Snowdon and Howard 
R. Vane 2003). 
The cause of business cycles and economic crises is not the behavior of the ra-
tional economic man, but, rather, the impossibility of its behavior as rational. This 
indicates that the assumption of rationality is an artificial relief, a kind of buzzword, 
which uses a simplified model to approach it to reality, because their individual deci-
sions cannot be fully predicted in advance, given the imperfect knowledge and in-
formation (Otmar Issing et al. 2005; Richard T. Froyen and Alfred V. Guender 
2008). 
This "Crisis of Macroeconomics" was first indicated by the Nobel Prize win-
ners, John Hicks and James Tobin, in the 1970s. Rational exercise of personal inter-
est is incongruent with macroeconomic phenomenon of instability and business cy- 
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cles. Elementary economic theory, as Lionel Robbins wrote, cannot explain the cy-
clic quality and instability of the market economy. The crisis in macroeconomics 
stems from the failure of economists to successfully integrate the level of current 
knowledge into their theories. If the notion that there is perfect knowledge is 
adopted, which is the case with the neoclassical economics, then everyone could cal-
culate the cumulative consequences of their actions, even when they are "somewhat 
irrational." 
Modern macroeconomics assumes not only the asymmetry in the distribution 
of information and knowledge, but their division – some have all the available infor-
mation and knowledge, while others have none. Traditional Keynesians believe in 
uncertainty due to lack of knowledge about the future, while Neoclassicists believe in 
quite the opposite - in full awareness of individuals. From this, the Neoclassicists 
conclude that the outcome is certain, and the Keynesians conclude that it is uncertain. 
If it is certain, we are moving towards one outcome because it arises from individu-
ally the same outcomes that are reachable for everyone, and with the Keynesians, it is 
quite the opposite. 
Neoclassicists do not distinguish between the two positions: first, the market 
has some information about the future and second, the market reacts "as if" the future 
is predictable and computable. Keynesians, on their part, do not distinguish between 
the two positions: first, the market cannot accurately quantify the future and second, 
the market forces are facing an uncertain future. 
Keynesians are wrong because they identify uncertainty with irrational behav-
ior, and in doing so, they are making the same mistake as the Neoclassicists. For 
Neoclassicists, rationality in the condition of perfect knowledge leads to certainty, 
and for Keynesians, irrationality in conditions of imperfect knowledge leads to un-
certainty. Basically, these are the two sides of the same coin, because it is assumed 
"as if" there is perfect knowledge concerning the economy (Peter J. Montiel 2003). 
There is a difference between market equilibrium and economic stability: (i) 
there is a balance of supply and demand in the market, but an individual does not 
know this and changes his/her behavior in the direction of instability; (ii) there is a 
balance of supply and demand, an individual knows this and does not change his/her 
behavior, and stability is maintained. 
If these differences are taken into account, then the re-research in macroeco-
nomics must start with the business cycles. A modern approach to the cyclical 
movements of the economy focuses political incentives of incumbent policymakers 
as the sources of a kind of economic fluctuations – political business cycles (Miomir 
Jakšić 2007). 
Classical model of connection between politics and economics entails the 
analysis of formulation, enacting, and consequences of economic policy for policy-
makers. The NPM analyses decisive influence of social and state factors – interest 
lobbies and groups – upon policymakers who surpass the role of economists. The 
government, according to the NPM, is in the very center, exposed to the influences of 
economics and politics. 
Two approaches – opportunistic and ideological (partisan) – marked the de-
velopment of the NPM since the mid-1970s of the twentieth century.  
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Assumptions about politicians are: (i) non-Partisan opportunistic politicians – 
their focal group are all voters; (ii) Partisan ideological politicians – their focal group 
is only their party membership. 
Assumptions about voters and economic agents are: (i) non-rational behavior, 
non-rational expectations; (ii) rational behavior, rational expectations. 
 
Table 1   Models of Political Macroeconomics  
 
Assumptions about voters 
Policymakers` motivation 
Opportunistic – Politicians only 
care about re-election 
Partisan – Policymakers are 
ideologically motivated 
Naïve and adaptive expectations – traditional 
models 
(exploitable Phillips curve trade-off) 
William D. Nordhaus (1975) 
Assar Lindbeck (1976)   Douglas A. Hibbs (1977) 
Rational expectations – rational models 
(short-run Phillips curve trade-off) 
Alex Cukierman and Alan H. 
Meltzer (1986) 
Kenneth Rogoff and Anne 
Sibert (1988) 
Rogoff (1990) 
Alberto Alesina (1987) 
 
Source: Snowdon and Vane (2005, p. 526). 
 
The basic political model includes: (i) voters with adaptive-naive or rational 
expectations; (ii) opportunistic government focused towards all voters, or partisan-
ideological government focused only towards party membership. 
Introduction of government was of crucial importance, as government must 
take care about big actors – stakeholders – voters, political competitors, and external 
political and economic competitors. Government behaviors become strategic and 
game theory becomes essential for the explanation of politico-economic outcomes 
(Wendy Carlin and David Soskice 2006). 
 
2. Credibility, Reputation, and Role of Institutions 
 
Introduction of rational expectations into a simplified analysis of political cycles im-
poses the problems of economic policy inefficiency, time inconsistency, and the 
problem of dominant strategy in the game of formulating economic policy. 
Rational political business cycles model includes the following assumptions: 
(i) individual actors make rational expectations in the environment of income and 
price rigidities; (ii) business cycles are a consequence of changes of aggregate de-
mand; (iii) aggregate demand influences the level of output and employment, as 
nominal rigidities obstruct fast changes in incomes and prices; (iv) aggregate demand 
fluctuations obstruct attaining equilibrium employment; (v) supply shocks influence 
equilibrium employment, while institutional and political differences between the 
countries are important factors of the level of employment. 
Rational behavior of the public limits the extent to which policymakers can in-
fluence the economic cycle by: (i) political decisions (behavior of the public when 
voting); (ii) economic policy results (via the expectations-augmented Phillips curve).  
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Introducing the rational behavior of voters prevents a systematic influence of 
the policymakers, and therefore, even the choice of particular economic policy in-
struments cannot be a surprise for them, which could make an impact on the real 
economic movements. Sources of cyclic fluctuations of the macroeconomic variables 
within the rational models of political cycles are: imperfect information about the 
character of economic environment at the disposal of the rational voters; imperfect 
information about the goals of policymakers at the disposal of the rational voters; and 
imperfect information about the capabilities of policymakers at the disposal of ra-
tional voters, which is on their competence. 
Government’s competence is defined in different ways in the rational oppor-
tunistic models: by capability to implement appropriate fiscal policy (Rogoff and 
Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990); by providing economic growth not followed by inflation 
(Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 1990); and by isolating economy of random 
shocks that affect it (Cukierman and Melcer 1986). 
One of the leading proponents of NPM, Daron Acemoglu, explains the differ-
ences between national economies in economic growth with two dominant paradigms 
– geographical and institutional. The geographical paradigm explains economic 
growth by dominant factors of geography, climate, and ecology, while the institu-
tional paradigm considers institutions as essential factors in promoting investment in 
human, physical capital, technology, and knowledge. 
Good institutions possess three attributes: (i) they establish property rights in 
the society; (ii) they limit all elites whose goal is rent seeking; (iii) they ensure equal 
opportunities for all individuals in a society in the field of employment, social secu-
rity, and human rights. 
To understand the path of democratic political development seems even harder 
than measuring democracy in one country. It is often claimed that there were two 
waves of democratization in the established democracies: before the First World War 
and after the Second World War. According to Acemoglu and James A. Robinson 
(2006), process of democratization is characterized by the following: (i) warranted 
democratic progress does not exist; (ii) monocausal explanations of democracy are 
not fruitful; (iii) factors of establishment and consolidation of democracy are differ-
ent; (iv) fundamental conflict exists between elites and public: public is prodemoc-
ratic, while elites are nondemocratic; (v) democracy depends upon conflict between 
public and elites: when the benefit from democracy is greater than the cost of keep-
ing nondemocracy, transition to democracy occurs; (vi) social outcomes are uncer-
tain and depend upon many factors, and nondemocracy can transform to democracy 
and vice versa. 
Economic origins of democracy could be determined by the triangle of the fol-
lowing factors (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006): (i) economic incentives determines 
the political behavior and individual act rationally according to game theory; (ii) con-
flicts have a key role because different social groups have their separate interests 
about possible social outcomes; (iii) political institutions have a central role in the 
process of solving conflicts, as they define future distribution of de jure political 
power. 
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The questions were also raised about the correlation between the level of de-
mocratic development and level of economic development (income per capita), level 
of development of the educational system, labor share, level of inequality of a distri-
bution of income, and level of income redistribution. Freedom house democracy in-
dices document the main thesis that wealthier countries are more democratic, and 
that there is a strong correlation between the level of income and democratization: 
wealthier countries (USA, Canada, Australia) are more democratic, while poorer 
countries (sub-Saharan Africa, South America, Central America) are less democratic. 
Higher inequality is strongly connected with lower level of democracy: countries 
with higher inequality and higher Gini coefficient are less democratic. 
The third significant wave of democratization refers to democratization of the 
former socialist countries in the period of 1990s, which occurred parallel to signifi-
cant economic changes – transformation of the former socialist economies into mar-
ket economies. 
 
3. Economic Reforms and Democratization Processes in Serbia 
 
In Serbia, the economic system reforms began after political changes that occurred in 
October 2000. After a 10-year period of economic stagnation (1991–2000) marked 
by economic sanctions (1992–2000), exclusion from international flows of people 
and capital, hyperinflation (1993), millions of unemployed people, general poverty of 
the population, unutilized economic capacities, technological backwardness of the 
economy, and NATO bombing, in 2001, Serbia rapidly began a process of economic 
transition. 
In 2000, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
transition indicators for Serbia showed that there was little or no progress in imple-
menting economic reforms, when compared with 1989, and thus, in 2000, the sum of 
the transition indicators was less than that in 1989 (Table 2)
1. 
 
Table 2   Transition Indicators for Serbia (1989 and 2000) 
 
Year  LP  SP  ER  PL  TFS  CP  BRIRL  SMNBFI OIR  TOTAL 
1989  1.00  3.00  1.00  2.67  2.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  13,67 
2000  1.00  3.00  1.00  2.33  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  2.00  13,33 
 
Source: EBRD (1999-2009). 
 
To sum up, Serbia started the process of democratization and economic re-
forms in extremely poor economic conditions. However, in early 2001, there was 
                                                        
1 EBRD determines progress in transition based on nine indicators: large-scale privatization (LP), small-
scale privatization (SP), enterprise restructuring (ER), price liberalization (PL), trade and forex system 
(TFS), competition policy (CP), banking reform and interest-rate liberalization (BRIRL), securities mar-
kets and non-bank financial institutions (SMNBFI), and overall infrastructure reform (OIR). According 
to the EBRD methodology, minimal value of an individual indicator equals 1, which corresponds to the 
sum of 9 points for a total of indicators taken. When the sum equals 9 points, there is no progress in tran-
sition, and it is represented by 0% of transition realized.   
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great public support for economic and political reforms in Serbia. This support is best 
reflected in the election results for parliamentary elections in December 2000, where 
a coalition of parties (DOS) that carried the reforms won as much as 70.4% of seats 
in the new assembly. 
As in other countries, in Serbia too, on the one hand, there were generally 
supported political changes that implied the development of multiparty system, pub-
lic involvement in all political decisions, civil society development, and institution 
building. However, on the other hand, Serbian citizens were faced with huge eco-
nomic costs of transition. 
Owing to the economic costs of transition, the democratic process can occur as 
a limiting factor for the development of a new market system. However, in Serbia, 
there was a commitment to implement economic transition together with the devel-
opment of a democratic system. Therefore, parallel with the economic transition in 
Serbia, it was necessary to ensure the consolidation of democracy and prevent the 
return of a nondemocratic order. In some moments, it seemed that the goal of main-
taining the country's democratic course was more important than the economic tran-
sition, and knowing that it is necessary to have public support for that, sometimes it 
was decided to let go of the too radical transitional cuts to provide political support 
for the “pro-democratic" and "pro-European" political forces. 
 
Table 3   Transition Indicators for Serbia – Achieved Progress in Transition
2 
 





2000  1  3  1  2.33  1  1  1  1  2 13.33  14.45 
2001  1  3  1  4  2.67  1  1  1  2 16.67  25.59 
2002  2  3  2  4  3  1  2.33  1.67  2 21  40.04 
2003  2.33  3  2  4  3  1  2.33  2  2 21.66  42.24 
2004  2.33  3.33  2  4  3  1  2.33  2  2 21.99  43.34 
2005  2.67  3.33  2.33  4  3.33  1  2.67  2  2 23.33  47.81 
2006  2.67  3.67  2.33  4  3.33  1.67  2.67  2  2 24.34  51.18 
2007  2.67  3.67  2.33  4  3.33  2  2.67  2  2 24.67  52.28 
2008  2.67  3.67  2.33  4  3.67  2  3  2  2.33 25.67  55.62 
2009  2.67  3.67  2.33  4  4  2  3  2  2.33 26  56.72 
 
Source: EBRD (1999-2009). 
 
The consolidation of the democratic system, as an important element of politi-
cal and economic transition, is based on the idea that citizens are more prodemocrati-
cally oriented than the elite, for one simple reason – democracy provides citizens 
much more benefits than nondemocracy. The elite, on the other hand, may be en-
couraged to support nondemocratic processes and the forces that will increase their 
economic prosperity. Is there, on the other hand, any possibility to consolidate a de-
mocracy without sufficient support from the citizens, and with strong support by the 
                                                        
2 Total scale of progress in transition according to the EBRD transition indicators goes from 9 points (0% 
achieved reforms) to 38.97 points (100% achieved reforms).  
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elite? This is probably the key issue for countries in transition, and it is extremely 
relevant in Serbia. It is closely related to economic trends and conditions determining 
the voters when choosing between different parties and also between different ideo-
logical orientations, which is exactly what political macroeconomics is interested in. 
Although there is no guaranteed economic and social prosperity, or a system 
that provides it, the most important role in building a democratic and prosperous so-
ciety lies with the institutions. 
It is possible to compare the degree of the achieved level of economic transi-
tion and development of democracy in Serbia (Tables 3 and 4). The reached level of 
transition indicators show that in Serbia, the transition process was quickest in the 
first years (until 2003). Similar conclusions can be reached in the analysis of the de-
velopment of democracy in Serbia. This phenomenon was caused due to the transi-
tion costs, their disproportionate transfer to certain structures of the population, as 
well as the negative effects of the economic reforms, which further led to resistance 
to the reforms and reduced public support. 
 
Table 4   Indicators of Democracy in Serbia
3 
 
Year EP  CS  IM  NGOV  LGOV  JFI  CO  Democratic 
score  Type of the regime 
1999–2000
  5.50 5.25 5.75 5,50 5.50 5.75 6.25  5.67  Semi-consolidated 
authoritarian regime 
2001  4.75 4.00 4.50 5,25 5.25 5.50 6.25  5.04  Semi – consolidated 
authoritarian regime 
2002  3.75 3.00 3.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 5.25  4.00  Transitional  regime 
2003  3.75 2.75 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 5.00  3.88  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2004  3.50 2.75 3.50 4.00 4.00 4.25 5.00  3.83  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2005  3.25 2.75 3.25 4.00 3.75 4.25 5.00  3.75  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2006  3.25 2.75 3.25 4.00 3.75 4.25 4.75  3.71  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2007  3.25 2.75 3.50 3.75 3.75 4.25 4.50  3.68  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2008  3.25 2.75 3.75 4.00 3.75 4.50 4.50  3.79  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
2009  3.25 2.75 3.75 4.00 3.75 4.50 4.50  3.79  Semi-consolidated 
democracy 
 
Source: Freedom House (2009). 
 
4. Transition Costs and Support for the Reforms 
 
The key limiting factor for the economic transition in Serbia, and its further democra-
tization, became the arising transition costs. These costs, but to even greater extent, 
                                                        
3 The democracy scale is a scale that goes from 7 (the lowest level of democracy – 0%) to 1 (the highest 
level of democracy – 100%). Democracy score (DS) is an average of ratings for the categories: electoral 
process (EP), civil society (CS), independent media (IM), national democratic governance (NGOV), local 
democratic governance (LGOV), judical framework and independence (JFI), and corruption (CO). 
 Data in the period before 2004 are given for Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).  
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unrealized hopes often motivated by unrealistic expectations from the process of 
economic transition and democratization, as well as opening the country to the world 
present immediately after the democratic changes, influenced the change in the pub-
lic atmosphere in Serbia. This change was related to the weakening of the support for 
the reforms, which involved a discontinuation of certain segments of the reforms. On 
the other hand, the responsibility for the weakened public support for economic re-
forms came from the inability to establish a consensus on common economic and 
broader social goals. 
Reduced support for the reforms has been visible in Serbia ever since 2003, 
and can be observed through election results. Among the economic reasons for this 
shift in public support were most certainly those of macroeconomic trends, such as 
unemployment rate, number of employed persons, GDP growth, earnings, and their 
growth rate. These indicators show a significant improvement of the macroeconomic 
trends in Serbia, but an insufficient improvement of the economic position of the 
most general population is also present. Thus, unemployment remains a significant 
problem, whereas the privatization process does not lead to the expected effects of 
better efficiency and improved performance of Serbian economy, but in a high per-
centage of privatized enterprises, it is manifested as a failed privatization. 
Because of the transition cost and the disappointment of expectations regard-
ing the improvement of living standards of the population, the opening of the country 
and its entry into the European integrations, as well as the construction of appropriate 
democratic institutions, in Serbia, one relationship has become particularly impor-
tant: the relationship between the public and the elite. It is a fact that different social 
groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political 
power and resources. Theoretical assumptions say that the public prefers democracy, 
while the elite are against it. This is way a democracy is consolidated when the elite 
is neither motivated nor strong enough to jeopardize it (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2006). 
In Serbia, fear of returning to the old regime made the elite prefer democracy 
because, for the elite, the costs of establishing a democracy were lower than those 
they would have if the repression returned. This led to a paradox – the elite pro-
claimed economic reforms and further democratization, while the poor public in-
creasingly challenged the question of the market economy system, and even the de-
mocratization process itself. In Serbia, this meant that the elite were able to abuse the 
democracy for the realization of their own goals. This abuse was also reflected in the 
use of economic policy in political purposes. 
 
5. Political Macroeconomics of the Economic Policy in Serbia 
 
Specifics of applying the model of political business cycles to economies in transi-
tion, such as Serbian economy, can be summarized as follows (Aleksandra Praščević 
2007): (i) specific motives of policymakers, different from those present in devel-
oped countries; (ii) voters who do not have sufficient knowledge about the market 
system and democratic procedure. 
In Serbia, political macroeconomics of the economic policy was defined by a 
considerable political instability, reflected in the following: (i) frequent elections at  
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various levels; (ii) differences in economic goals, and even more in political goals, of 
the participants in the elections – the political parties that can win power and become 
the economic policy creators. 
For the analysis of political influence on the economic policy in Serbia as a 
"new democracy" country, it is relevant to observe the studies of these phenomena in 
other "new democracy" countries, which show that it is primarily present in the area 
of fiscal policy in the form of political budget cycles, a term introduced by Rogoff 
(Rogoff 1990). Extensive reference on this subject shows that specifics of the politi-
cal and economic systems of the "new democracy" countries condition much greater 
presence of the phenomenon of political cycles in them than in the developed democ-
racies and developed economies, primarily in the form of higher budget deficits in 
pre-election periods due to growth in government spending or reduction in tax bur-
den, as well as in the form of changes in the structure of government expenditure in 
favor of those expenses that are currently visible to voters or whose effects are more 
visible, at the expense of investment (Adi Brender and Allen Drazen 2003, 2005; 
Persson and Tabellini 2002; Min Shi and Jacob Svensson 2002, 2006). 
The abuse of fiscal policy in Serbia in the form of fiscal manipulation has the 
following specific characteristics: (i) economic policymakers know the preferences 
of the population – income growth and price stability; (ii) economic policymakers are 
able to successfully manipulate economic policy, because voters are "myopic" or 
"selfish" – interested in improving, even in the short run, their own positions; (iii) in 
fiscal manipulation, economic policymakers choose the model of fiscal manipulation 
that targets certain groups of voters, and not the entire electorate, particularly to 
avoid a significant increase in the budget deficit and win votes; (iv) sources of fiscal 
manipulation in the pre-election are also the privatization revenues that the country 




The economic performances (inflation, unemployment, and growth) decisively influ-
ence voters and their behavior, and policymakers are aiming at re-election, while 
those in opposition strive to win and come to power. These facts are the basics of the 
NPM and they are applicable to both “old” and “new democracies.” 
Development of parliamentary democracy and economic transition are two 
mutually conditioned and parallel processes. The experiences of transition countries 
indicate that the development of parliamentary democracy has become an indispen-
sable factor in the transition process. Although it is possible to establish market 
economy in an authoritarian regime, most transition economies were urged to democ-
ratization, as an unavoidable factor whose benefits should substitute, at least the ma-
jority, if not all, the negative consequences to which the economic transition, at least 
in the early stages, led. The new system had to be based on new political foundations 
of individual freedom and liberalism. 
Political changes in Serbia were greatly supported by the public, but the eco-
nomic reforms incurred costs that were not consistently borne by the whole nation, 
but only by certain social structures. In this aspect, the entire democratic process can  
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be questioned, because it can occur as a limiting factor in the development of new 
market system. 
The economic policymakers in Serbia, although faced with a lack of rational 
subjects – the voters, who, especially in the early stages of transition, were not 
clearly familiar with either how the market economic system works or with the par-
liamentary democracy system, which is universal for the countries in transition and 
the "new democracy" countries – had significant limitations in terms of the abuse of 
economic policies that were themselves drawn from the preferences of the voters, as 
well as from economic and political conditions that were imposed by international 
factors, such as financial institutions, as well as the desire to join the European Un-
ion. These are the factors that definitely caused the situation in which neither mone-
tary nor fiscal expansion, which would have resulted in a high deficit or inflation, 
could be clearly seen. Instead, here is a greater extent of changes in the structure of 
government expenditures, privileged position of individual economic entities, and the 
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